



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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John D. L.

Cyprus: Meeting between Mrs Thatcher and the Prime Minister
of Greece

I enclose a brief on Cyprus for the meeting between Mrs Thatcher and Mr Papandreu in the margins of the European Council at Athens. Mr Papandreu is likely to want the UK to assume the role of mediator.

Mr Papandreu's request for a meeting with the Prime Minister followed immediately upon his meeting with President Kyprianou of Cyprus in Athens on 30 November. We have no definitive information about the outcome of that meeting. But press reports indicate that the meeting patched up the earlier disagreement between the two leaders on the question of consultations between the Guarantor Powers: Kyprianou had reportedly favoured these, while the Greeks have taken the line with us and in public that they will not talk to the Turks so long as Turkish troops remain "in occupation" of the north. The Greek position appears largely to have prevailed although press reports suggest that, in public at least, the pre-condition may have changed to one requiring the Turkish Cypriots to rescind their declaration of secession. The Greeks have told us that their earlier reply, refusing to take part in tripartite consultations, still stands. By way of a compromise, both leaders may have agreed to concentrate on the existing Greek proposal that the UK should take a leading role in the search for a settlement by carrying out bilateral UK/Greece and UK/Turkey talks.

There is very little prospect in the present climate of our being able to play a successful leading role either in resolving the present crisis, or in contributing to the longer-term search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Such an approach would also present considerable disadvantages. The Greeks' objective would be to use any such talks to put pressure on the Turks and to blame us for insufficient effort if these tactics failed to produce a reversal of the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence and Turkish recognition of it.

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Our own influence over the Turks is very limited: American pressure in connection with military aid appears to be the most fruitful source of leverage. Such influence as we have on the Turks is better used in conjunction with American efforts. Any suggestion that we were active at Greek behest would doom our activities to failure. Furthermore the Turks would probably maintain their present position that they would only take part in consultations if the Greeks did so too. (The Treaty of Guarantee requires the parties to consult "together". All previous consultations have been tripartite; when one guarantor power has been unwilling to take part there have been no consultations.)

The only advantage in agreeing to take on the role of mediator would be presentational - but these would be short lived if our efforts were seen to fail. At the moment public and Parliamentary opinion, except the pro-Turkish lobby, seems broadly satisfied with our stance and our efforts to get Guarantor Power talks going. If, as now seems likely, tripartite talks under the Treaty prove impossible, we should reinforce the weight we are already putting behind the efforts of the UN Secretary-General as the only sensible way of trying to make progress on the Cyprus problem.

The Prime Minister may therefore think it right to resist pressure from Papandreou for the UK to conduct parallel but separate consultations with both Greece and Turkey. We should say that any Guarantor Power talks under the Treaty must be tripartite. If it proves impossible to arrange these, we shall of course remain in close touch with all involved, including Greece and Turkey. But any such discussions would not be the consultations "together" envisaged in the Treaty. And the main role in promoting a solution to the Cyprus problem would rest with the UN Secretary-General.

The Points to Make on EC/Cyprus updates the main European Council brief to take account of Vice-President Haferkamp's talks with the Cyprus Government on 2 - 3 December. But this does not change the line in the main brief. Haferkamp will still not report to the Foreign Affairs Council until 19 December, and any further discussion of sanctions against northern Cyprus at the European Council remains entirely inappropriate. The High Commissioner in Nicosia, who will see Haferkamp on 3 December, is being asked to send a report of Haferkamp's discussions immediately to Athens.

/The enclosed



The enclosed brief has not been seen by Sir Geoffrey Howe: a copy is being submitted to him in parallel this evening.

*Yours
R B Bone*

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Private Secretary

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/ PS. I enclose a telegram we have just received from Athens reporting a call by the Ambassador on Papandreou. You may find it useful additional background. It broadly confirms the above account of Papandreou's meeting with Kyprianou.

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BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER

CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Despite the great set-back that UDI represents, we continue to want a solution to the Cyprus problem that will be acceptable to both communities. Also imperative to ensure that situation in Cyprus does not deteriorate further. In particular, military escalation by any of the parties should be avoided. Our actions since UDI have been dictated by these considerations. Hope that you will be guided similarly.

2. We were pleased that the UN Security Council resolution deploring UDI, based on the UK draft and amended in light of discussions in London between President Kyprianou and me, was passed so quickly and overwhelmingly. We made our own position clear immediately after UDI: we deplored the Turkish Cypriot action, wanted it reversed, would not recognise any state in Cyprus other than the Republic of Cyprus and hoped that other states would follow suit. We had earlier told both the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriots that we hoped they would not go down the road of independence. Greatly regret that this advice was not heeded.

3. UN SCR 541 mandated the Secretary General to pursue his mission of good offices. Believe that this is the best way forward and strongly support him. Hope that you will too. [If it is suggested that the mission of good offices is dependent on withdrawal of UDI or some other condition] All parts of the Security Council Resolution carry equal weight. Pre-conditions will serve only to delay possibility of progress. Secretary General should be allowed to act quickly while the Turks and Turkish Cypriots still feel on the defensive. New talks between the two communities need not imply recognition of Denktash.

Consultations between Guarantor Powers

4. Understand that your Government will not join us and the Turkish Government in tripartite talks. Have you considered presentational impact that this will have? Turks will say that your refusal is as much a breach of the Treaty of Guarantee as anything else that has happened. We remain prepared to enter into such consultations as soon as the other two governments concerned are ready to do so.

UK to act as Mediator

5. Would need to consider this proposal carefully. At first sight, most reluctant. Likely to cut across Secretary General's efforts. Have no reason to believe Turks would accept it. Likely to argue that the Treaty of Guarantee obliges them only to enter into tripartite consultations. That indeed is our reading of our obligations under the Treaty. We shall of course stay in close touch with all parties concerned and continue to do what we can to assist in bringing about a solution. This will involve keeping in close touch with you, and also with the Turkish Government. But would see this as different from the 'consultations together' required by the Treaty. Are also in close touch with President Kyprianou. Important that none of our efforts should be used by anyone as an excuse for not making progress.

EC Action against Northern Cyprus [If raised]

6. Matter was discussed fully by Foreign Ministers on 22 and 29 November. Vice President Haferkamp will be reporting to the Foreign Affairs Council on 19 December, following preparatory discussions on Coreper. No new decisions until then.

7. We should be scrupulous in avoiding any action which might prejudice non-recognition of the Turkish Cypriot regime. But the Community's approach should also be consistent with the aim of nullifying effects of Turkish Cypriot decision. Should avoid action which will reinforce existing divisions.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. On 15 November the Turkish Cypriot 'Assembly' issued a declaration purporting to establish an independent state in northern Cyprus. The same day the Secretary of State said in the House of Commons that Her Majesty's Government deplored this action by the Turkish Cypriot community and considered it incompatible with the 1960 Treaties. So far only Turkey has recognised the new 'state'.
2. On 18 November the UN Security Council passed (13-1-1) a resolution (copy attached) deploring the action, calling for its reversal, and instructing the UN Secretary General to pursue attempts to reach a solution to the Cyprus problem through his mission of good offices. The resolution was based on a British draft, amended in light of discussions between the Prime Minister and President Kyprianou of Cyprus on 17 November.
3. Immediately after the declaration, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposed to his Turkish and Greek colleagues joint consultations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (copy attached). The Greek Government refused to talk to the Turks while Turkish troops remained in northern Cyprus and have twice confirmed that this is their position. Turkey agreed to consultations provided Greece also took part. Recent statements by Papandreou and President Kyprianou suggest that both the Greek and Cyprus Governments would like the UK to take on the role of mediator. (The Greek Government had earlier proposed UK/Greek and UK/Turkish bilateral discussions).
4. Papandreou sees the Cyprus problem primarily as an element in the dispute between Greece and Turkey. He has little concern for the welfare of either community in Cyprus, and sees UDI as an opportunity to score propaganda victories over the Turks. Before their summit meeting on 30 November he and Kyprianou seemed

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unable to co-ordinate their response to UDI (which may have accounted in part for the fairly complacent attitude of the Turks).

5. If Papandreou suggests that the UK should take on the role of mediator, his motives will probably be to use our efforts as a forum to attack the Turks.

*Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).
O'Wayland, 31 January 2013*

6. Our own perception of the best way forward is to persuade the UN Secretary General actively to pursue his mission of good offices and try to find some means by which the parties can again be brought to negotiate with each other. Inevitably, in the aftermath of Denktash's declaration, this will take time. But the earlier he starts and the less he is fettered by preconditions, or diverted by attempts to set up alternative machinery, the better.

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