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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1985

ARMS CONTROL: SOVIET VIOLATIONS

I enclose a copy of a message from President Reagan to the Prime Minister, received on the direct line late last night, seeking the United Kingdom's support at the Nuclear Planning Group Ministerial today and tomorrow for communique language stating concern over Soviet violations of arms control agreement.

As you know, I conveyed the gist of this to Richard Mottram in Brussels last night, saying that I thought the Prime Minister would wish to be helpful to the United States consistently with our own judgement of Soviet activities. Richard told me that language had been discussed informally with the United States during the evening and he believed that a form of words satisfactory to the Americans could be agreed. He promised to let me know this morning if difficulties developed.

I should be grateful to be kept abreast. If we are able to help the Americans, I should be grateful for a quick draft reply from the Prime Minister to the President.

The rule is that messages received on this link should have a very limited distribution indeed. You should not send it to Brussels nor should it be referred to in discussions there. But Richard Mottram of course knows the gist of it.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Colin Budd (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

(Charles Powell)

Denis Brennan, Esq., Ministry of Defence.



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US Declassified

PRIME MINISTER'S

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OCTOBER 28, 1985

DEAR MARGARET:

WE HAVE DISCUSSED MANY TIMES MY DEEP CONCERN OVER SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. AS YOU KNOW, THE US GOVERNMENT HAS CONDUCTED SEVERAL EXTENSIVE STUDIES, AND CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS VIOLATED ITS LEGAL OBLIGATION OR POLITICAL COMMITMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE SALT 11 AGREEMENT, THE ABM TREATY, THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, THE BIOLOGICAL AND TO XIN WEAPONS CONVENTION, THE GENEVA PROTOCOL ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS HAVE LIKELY VIOLATED PROVISIONS OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY.

WE HAVE SHARED OUR FINDINGS AND THE EVIDENCE FOR THEM WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN BOTH NATO AND BILATERAL TALKS, INCLUDING EXTENSIVE MEETINGS BETWEEN OUR EXPERTS AND YOURS.

AS WE APPROACH THE NOVEMBER MEETINGS WITH MR. GORBACHEV, IT IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER FOR THE WEST TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT VIOLATIONS AND ACTIONS INCONSISTENT WITH ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS ARE UNACCEPTABLE, NOT JUST TO THE US BUT TO OTHER WESTERN NATIONS AS WELL. THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MINISTERIAL, WHICH WILL BE HELD OCTOBER 29 AND 30 IN BRUSSELS, IS AN IDEAL TIME FOR NATO TO STATE PUBLICLY ITS CONCERN OVER SOVIET VIOLATIONS, AND I STNCERELY HOPE YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL SUPPORT US IN INCLUDING SUCH LANGUAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

THE US AND ITS NATO ALLIES HAVE A SHARED INTEREST IN SUPPORTING THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. THE SOVIET PATTERN OF NONCOMPLIANCE RAISES FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE INTEGRITY OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS, CONCERNS THAT -- IF NOT CORRECTED -- UNDERCUT THE VIABILITY OF ARMS CONTROL AS AN INSTRUMENT TO ASSIST IN ENSURING A SECURE AND STABLE FUTURE WORLD. A STRONG ALLIED CONSENSUS ON CONCERN OVER SOVIET VIOLATIONS WILL STRENGTHEN OUR EFFORTS BOTH IN SEEKING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND IN SEEKING EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR FUTURE AGREEMENTS. THE SUCCESS OF SUCH EFFORTS WILL IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS.

SINCERELY,

END OF PAGE 01