

Private Secretary

Charles (Powell)

I understood from
Len (a rather
hurried message)
that you wanted
cc of the pps
on ? KOHL/
LOCARNO / AUSTEN
CHAMBERLAIN.

Are these
helpful : or wd
you like more/
different ones.

Colin
Budd
22/11

See para. 13 on Locarno

RECORD OF HM AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON CHANCELLOR KOHL:

BUNDESKANZLERAMT 1600 HRS, 7 JANUARY 1985

wlc 227/1

General

1. The call lasted 70 minutes. It took place in a ^{markedly} friendly atmosphere. Kohl was relaxed and did most of the talking, which ranged widely.

Detail

2. The Ambassador remarked that he had just been reading the Annual Review of GOC Berlin; it had been a good year for the city. The Chancellor agreed. Everyone now agreed how well Diepgen, whom Kohl had backed as von Weizsäcker's successor, was doing as Governing Mayor. The city had recovered its vitality; tourism was booming; any improvement in East-West relations from the Geneva talks could only benefit Berlin.

3. The Chancellor said there was however the worrying problem of the 10-11,000 draft dodgers coming to Berlin. This was 1% of the voters and growing. Even if the Greens fell back in the Federal Republic this influx meant the Alternative Liste (AL) would continue strong in Berlin. The change in the city's voting structure could damage the image of the city. He gave the example of a Berlin subsidiary of a firm owned by the Federal Post Minister and Frau Schwarz-Schilling which was having to reverse expansion plans in the face of new environmental controls. It was vital for Berlin that it should develop a tertiary sector of high technology small firms linked to the Technical University, but the growing influence of the AL worked against this. Another danger was the way in which the AL had weakened the left wing of the Berlin SPD so that this party - traditionally rather right leaning - now had to try to lean to the left, so that Apel was seen almost as an isolated right-wing radical. In the Federal Republic the government was getting a grip on the problem of conscientious objectors - even though the social work alternative was still too often a soft option. But in Berlin nothing could yet be done. He had mentioned it to President Reagan and to Mrs Thatcher as a problem which also concerned the Allies. It must first be considered internally, but might then be raised with the Allies later in the year. The Allies shared the interest in not seeing Berlin drift into being a second Danzig. I said we were aware of the problem: the question was whether it could be better tackled at the Berlin or at the FRG end.

4. The Ambassador said Mr Jopling's visit for Green Week would be the third in which he had accompanied British visitors to

/Berlin

Berlin . The first had been Mr Pattie's visit with Herr Riesenhuber. The idea of developing the city as a centre of high technology was a good one and Diepgen's visit to the UK had therefore included a tour of the Cambridge Science Park. The Chancellor agreed that alternative prospects for Berlin, eg its development as a centre of East/West trade, were far less promising.

5. The Ambassador said HMG could agree with much in the Chancellor's New Year message: 1984 had been a good year for the Federal Republic, and for FRG/UK relations too. The Chancellor agreed and remarked he would be satisfied if 1985 was as good: he did not mind brickbats at himself provided the electorate still voted the right way.

6. The Ambassador referred to the opening of the Geneva Talks between the US and USSR. The Chancellor said this was a subject he would wish to discuss very intensively with the Prime Minister. The FRG and UK must work together to remind the United States of European interests. Washington was liable to see them as peripheral. No world power was ever psychologically very clever - the last NATO conference had illustrated this. He had had to tell the US that they should speak to other Allies and not just to the FRG. Americans found it difficult to remember that Western Europe was composed of different nations with interests different from their own. He and Mrs Thatcher had good personal relations with the President and the trust of the US; it was therefore largely up to them to exercise influence on behalf of Europe.

7. The Chancellor said he was convinced that in many ways the West was in a better position than at any time since World War II. In the US Reagan had convincingly been re-elected, had a Senate majority and a near majority in Congress. US policy was basically not criticised in West Europe - even Mitterrand, a Socialist, was sound on this. Reagan now had 3 or 4 years before worrying about new elections. The same was true in the FRG. Elsewhere the Benelux had some good and stable leaders (Martens in Belgium was especially good). He agreed the Danes were a weak link but pointed to the very firm leadership in Norway. Generally time was working against the Soviet Union. This could be sensed throughout the Warsaw Pact area. Even in Bulgaria that consummate opportunist Zhivkov, who could hear the grass grow across the Black Sea, had become very interesting. The West should try to help this process along. Honecker was another example. There was no question of a dissolution of the Warsaw Pact but the industrial countries were gaining more free room for movement. One truly sensational development in 1984 had been the opening of a cable TV connection with Vienna: already 240,000 houses in Budapest could now watch perfect quality western TV. The Hungarians had handled this cleverly. They allowed things to develop and mature

/before

before making any announcements. The Chancellor, instancing his father's listening to Allied wartime broadcasts, remarked in this connection on Vienna's prestige in Eastern Europe as a source of news and reliable information.

8. The Chancellor said in summary that this was the kind of development which Western leaders should discuss: strategic thinking was necessary as the long-term developments in the GDR and Eastern Europe must be studied. The UK's position was very important in this regard.

9. The Chancellor said another subject he also wished to discuss was the 40th Anniversary of the end of the war in Europe. It might seem illogical but the 40th Anniversary was more important for Germany than the 10th or 20th. For the first time 2/3 of the population was post-war and post-Hitler (he remarked on the passing of the influential generation born in 1900) and could bear to focus on this subject. In general the old wounds of the Germans had scarred over - but they could still hurt on occasion and this could be one of them. It was very important that the Federal Republic find the right tone for the Anniversary. The Chancellor favoured a special session of the Federal Parliament, to be addressed by the Federal President (ie free of the normal Parliamentary procedures which would offer opportunities for disruption by the Greens, together with a special service the same day by the Evangelical and Roman Catholic churches in Cologne cathedral. In answer to a question from the Ambassador he confirmed that he did not expect President Reagan still to be in the FRG on 8 May. He said he would also speak at a memorial gathering at the former concentration camp site at Bergen Belsen towards the end of April, organised by a German Jewish organisation. The Ambassador might wish to attend, since the camp had been liberated by British forces.

10. Reverting to the question of German susceptibilities over the 40th Anniversary, the Chancellor noted that President Mitterrand had said that the souls of friends must not be wounded. This was very important. The Ambassador said we had not yet received any invitations from East European countries for commemoration of the Anniversary. They would need cautious handling. The Chancellor emphatically agreed and asked that the Ambassador consult him personally - claiming that he understood the psychological implications for the younger generation better than his Ministers did. Provided the West Germans handled the Anniversary well themselves he was, however, not much worried what the GDR and other East bloc countries did or alleged.

11. The Ambassador said he had not forgotten what the Chancellor had said to him about Hess and pressure from the Churches, which had indeed developed. The UK had taken the lead in organising a further Allied demarche to the USSR, but it had again been rejected. The Chancellor said it was most important to bring it home convincingly to the German people whose fault it was that Hess remained imprisoned.

12. The Ambassador referred to the section of the Chancellor's New Year message regarding the need for a new impulse, with France, for the construction of European union. What form did Kohl envisage this impulse taking? The Chancellor said this needed discussion. The Brussels European Council would be too swamped with detail, but he was determined to continue to insist that at the Milan Council a whole day be set aside for discussion of this topic. He wished to bring the UK fully into this discussion. He wanted pragmatic moves - not Hegelian bastract concepts. There must be as many practical examples of cooperation as possible, eg industrial cooperation. It was laughable just to complain about Japan: Europe must do more for and by itself. The question was whether the United Kingdom would pull in the same direction. The Ambassador interjected that he was sure of this: making Europe more competitive with Japan and the US was one of the chief British priorities.

13. The Chancellor said it was necessary to think in longer dimensions. It was true now as it had been in 1925 at the time of the Locarno Conference that this was a decisive period for the future destiny of the German people. It was one of his primary tasks as Chancellor to work to ensure the irreversible anchoring of the Germans in the West. The UK had an important role to play in this and it was of course also in our own interest.

14. The Ambassador referred to the Secretary of State's recent speeches in Bonn and Berlin and to his latest statement in 'Handelsblatt' (31 December) which gave a good summary plus some fresh points. These had put over HMG's views on European unity. But he was not sure that the Prime Minister understood what the Chancellor meant by this term.

15. The Chancellor said he must talk this over with her. It was natural that the British had a different viewpoint - so would the Germans if they lived on an island. He was quite certain that the UK and Mrs Thatcher had a key role to play (he had noticed already an evolution in the Prime Minister's views on Europe in the last 5 years). Just as he could speak to Honecker in a way other European leaders could not so the Prime Minister could speak to Europe (and to Gorbachev, as the Ambassador pointed out).

16. The Chancellor reverted to the situation in Germany. He noted that the GDR was working hard to try to appropriate the German national inheritance (he instanced publishing expenditure, eg on second-rank figures such as Mörike, and the new GDR rehabilitation of Graf von Stauffenberg). He said there was a widespread misunderstanding about German 'nationalism': historically it was more a phenomenon of the left than of the right. Now the neutralism advocated by the left and promoted from the GDR needed a supporting basis in nationalism (he instanced Rudolph Baro).

/The

The Chancellor said he saw it as his task to try to counter this trend. The Germans did not have a stable patriotism such as came naturally to the British. He pointed out that he had been the first Chancellor to attend rallies of the Expellees. He did this to try to ensure against them drifting into right wing radicalism (although he would not attend the Silesian rally unless the proposed slogan was changed). The Expellees had integrated into West German society. They must be allowed the right to sadness at the loss of their homelands but must also be helped to understand that no border claims would be possible and that a third of the former Reich was lost for ever. He recalled (yet again) the moving experience of a pilgrimage gathering of Expellees in Württemberg which he had attended and which had been addressed by the Bishop of Rottenburg on the theme of reconciliation with Poland. Many of the Expellees had had terrible experiences and yet were free of bitterness. Germans had had very different destinies at the end of the war; the grass must be allowed to grow over the past (however, it was wounding to hear accusations of revanchism so soon after the massive popular movement to send gift parcels to Poland).

17. The Ambassador noted that the Chancellor had again used the term 'Fatherland' as the final word in his New Year's address. The Chancellor said the Fatherland was a creation of history. But whereas the French had managed to heal psychological wounds by the killing of some 35,000 collaborators the Germans had not experienced any sense of purging at the end of the war. Financial penalties according to length of Nazi party membership had been no substitute and had been unjust in many individual cases (he gave examples). This had contributed to a whole generation being unable to discuss the Nazi period with their children.

18. The Ambassador noted that the time set for his call had expired. The Chancellor interjected that he had enjoyed it and that the Ambassador must come often to see him - not only with the Prime Minister. The Ambassador referred briefly to the importance of seeing that the Fontainebleau conclusions were carried into action, including the 1000 MECU compensation for the UK. The Chancellor agreed. The Ambassador also expressed satisfaction at the close working relationship established between the UK and FRG Ministers of Defence, eg in the EPEG. The Chancellor agreed and said that much more could and should be done in defence industrial cooperation. He noted that in this field the Federal Republic had fewer problems than had the French.

19. The Chancellor said he had been reflecting over the Christmas break. To summarise, he felt sure that we were in the middle of an important transition period for the peoples of Europe. At the Dublin European Council he had been bitter at the continued lack of constructive work for Europe's future. Heads of Government had been enmeshed in questions of detail which few of them had understood properly (eg he had been the only one - due to his

/Rhineland-

Rhineland-Pfalz background - to understand the wine issue and had been able to get that settled. There was a great need for Summits to discuss broad concepts, rather than just work through detailed points submitted up to them from (with all respect) Political Directors. The Ambassador recalled that HMG had proposed that at least one meeting of the European Council each year should be Gymnich-type, for precisely such broader discussions.

20. Parting remarks included a reference by the Ambassador to a book on German military history which he had been reading, and which Kohl said had got him into trouble with his Defence Minister because he had agreed to accept a copy without looking at its content first. The Chancellor warmly recommended Dr Jung - an old student friend of his, now Head of the Intelligence Department in the Kanzleramt - as an expert on German military history.

21. The Ambassador noted, in connection with the Chancellor's references to Locarno, that the Treaty's 60th Anniversary would fall in December. The Chancellor proposed that they should get together in some way to commemorate it. The Ambassador said he would make a proposal nearer the time.

10 January 1985

Sir Julian Bullard KCMG

(11)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

RESTRICTED

BONN.



4 March 1985 ^{LF6}/₅

Peter Hall Esq
Director of Research
FCO

WED 220/3
09 APR 1985

① Mr Fear (1)
② Mr Anderson
Mr Llewellyn Smith
Mr [unclear]
28/3
6/3

My dear Peter,

LOCARNO 1925 AND 1985

1. Christopher Mallaby has shown me your letter to him of 14 February and the fascinating enclosures. I am most grateful to you and the Historical Branch for their researches.

2. I note that there was no great enthusiasm in London for marking the 50th anniversary of Locarno in 1975. I imagine that the same will be true this time, all the more so because we shall all have had our fill of anniversaries by the time we get to the autumn. I shall quite understand if WED think it prudent to keep absolutely silent about the 60th anniversary of Locarno, rather than risk putting ideas into peoples' heads, eg by enquiring of the Swiss what may be their intentions.

3. Here in Bonn, however, there are two special factors. One is that Chancellor Kohl has a bee in his bonnet about Locarno. As an amateur historian, he sees it as a brave and far-sighted attempt, mainly on British initiative, to bring Germany back from her position of isolation and ignominy into the community of nations on an equal footing with others. The papers enclosed with your letter give some support to this view. Austen Chamberlain spoke himself of "reconciliation with Germany". Like the Swiss orator at Locarno in 1975, I am struck by the modernity of some of the expressions used by the Foreign Ministers of the signatory

/countries

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countries at the time. Both Briand and Stresemann made the point that we were all citizens of Europe as well as of our own countries, and their Belgian colleague spoke of working together "for the greatest good of the European community". At the same time several of them emphasized that the treaties themselves would be of no value if the will to put them into effect and to build on them further did not exist. So they were to some extent realists as well as visionaries.

4. Secondly, I have told Kohl that I shall be making a proposal for marking the 60th anniversary of Locarno in some way, of course on local basis. I should not wish to fall down on this promise, and in any case I see the matter as potentially useful in the Anglo-German context.

5. I have in mind two things, on both of which I should be grateful for your help. First, I should like to organise a lecture in Bonn (perhaps on Monday 2 December, since the actual anniversary of signature, the first of the month, is a Sunday) on the theme of Locarno and its significance in the history of twentieth century Europe. The lecture would have to be given in German, and good German at that, although questions and answers afterwards could be consecutively interpreted. I would plan to put the lecturer up at my house and give a dinner which I would try to get Chancellor Kohl to attend. The question of his fares and of a possible fee would arise. The British Council might or might not be willing to help. I am writing to Michael Howard at Oxford to ask whether he can think of a suitable British academic. I should also be grateful for any advice you have to give me, both about a suitable name and about how the costs might be covered.

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6. Secondly, and regardless of what happens about the proposed lecture, I should like to give Kohl a collection of photocopies of appropriate documents in a nice drop-front box with a suitable inscription in gilt letters on the front. The then Historical Adviser and the FCO Binder helped me to do something similar for the departing FRG Ambassador in London in about 1980, and it gave enormous pleasure. Could you be so kind as to ask somebody to start looking through the files to see what documents might be available? Perhaps there is personal correspondence between Stresemann and Austen Chamberlain; or a minute by Chamberlain on the German diplomatic initiative of 9 February 1925 which may be seen as the starting point of the negotiations in Locarno which led up to the Treaty. If say 6 to 10 documents of this kind could be found and nicely photocopied, and put together in a box such as I have described, I feel quite sure that Kohl would be enormously pleased to have this gift. And we could get some publicity for it.

7. I hope that you will be able to help me.

JMB
Julian Bullard

J L Bullard

cc: Derek Thomas Esq, FCO
WED, FCO

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WED

4



My Name
Mr Anderson
Moses

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

17 May 1985

Dr. Dixon
CC Research Dep.

NRG 227/8
21 MAY 1985
✓ AN 21/5

Dear Charles,

Chancellor Kohl's Visit to Chequers, 18 May: Locarno

It is just possible that Chancellor Kohl may speak to the Prime Minister about a plan for marking the 60th Anniversary of the Locarno Treaty (more correctly, group of Treaties) with an academic seminar in Berlin, possibly attended by Foreign Ministers.

Locarno is Kohl's favourite treaty. He sees it as the first attempt to bring Germany out of her post-war humiliation and back into the Western community of nations. He thinks it failed because British interest melted away, and because the United States was absent. The Treaty was initialled in Locarno on 16 October 1925 and signed in London on 1 December the same year.

Some months ago Sir Julian Bullard had the idea of marking the anniversary with a lecture given in German and in Bonn by a British academic. He had in mind Professor James Joll. He thought of December rather than October, in order to register the London connection. He hoped he could get Chancellor Kohl to be present, and to attend a dinner at the Residence afterwards.

When Sir Julian Bullard put this idea to Teltschik, with the blessing of the FCO, he was told that the Chancellor had rather more far reaching ideas. Kohl was thinking of a conference of academics, to be held in the Reichstag in Berlin. Western Foreign Ministers might be invited (apparently not the Foreign Ministers of Poland and Czechoslovakia, although they also were signatories). It was left that Sir Julian Bullard would reflect on the German proposal, and the Germans on his.

/Since



Since then the Chancellor's office have been too busy to take the matter forward. They may in any case have had their fill of anniversaries for one year. But in case the Chancellor speaks to the Prime Minister on Saturday, you should be aware that we have distinct reservations about the idea of a grand seminar in Berlin - not so much for Berlin reasons, but because of the obvious flaws in the Locarno Treaty itself. It established greater security for Germany's western borders than for those in the East; it took the artificial attitude that an attack by France on Germany was as much to be resisted by Britain as an attack by Germany on France, and as likely; and it did after all fail to keep the peace. For all these reasons we consider that Sir Julian Bullard's suggestion for a lecture in Bonn would be more appropriate.

You may like to warn the Prime Minister. Teltschik said to Sir Julian Bullard at one point that he thought the Chancellor might already have mentioned the matter to her, perhaps at the European Council meeting at Brussels in March.

I enclose as background a copy of Roger Bone's letter of 6 June 1984, commenting on Kohl's Adenauer lecture at Oxford in May 1984.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

cc Mr. Dixon 20 (51)
Mr. Anders ACOB (para. 9)
Mrs Bowles (para. 10),

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Minister
cc Minister (E)
Head of Chancery
Mr Arthur
Mr Torry
Head of WED, FCO

Miss Cummings to see + per
(Mr. Bain + Parro have seen)
Clerk.

URG 020/3
24 JUL 1985
AW 24/7

27
7

TALK WITH KOHL, 18 JULY

1. I should record a bit more about the talk with Kohl reported in Bonn telnos 730 and 731.

Austen Chamberlain

2. The new biography, of which Mr Anderson in WED kindly got me a copy at short notice, was a big hit with Kohl, though I did not get the impression that he intended to do anything more with it than put it on his shelf and point it out to visitors. He recommended to me a two-volume life of Stresemann, but could not remember the name of the author, with the result that people kept popping in at intervals with the names of this or that biography of Stresemann. The one he meant turned out to be by Lord d'Abernon, the British Ambassador in Berlin at the time of Locarno.

The professionalisation of German politics

3. Kohl's point here was that German elected assemblies were full of people who would scarcely be capable of earning their living in any other way than by politics. He wondered how many members of the Bundestag and of the provincial parliaments would be directly elected if this were put to the test - or rather, he gave me exact

/percentages

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percentages to show what would be the results for each of the three main parties if this happened, the SPD's figure being of course the lowest. One of the troubles, according to Kohl, was that politics were so badly paid compared with other professions. And even within the political arena, the pay of a member of the Bundestag was not enough to compensate for the stresses and strains and responsibilities. He contrasted the hectic life in Bonn with the agreeable routine of ^{a member of} the Landtag in Munich, travelling to his work in a comfortable train through smiling countryside, knocking off on Thursdays and earning only DM 100 per month less than his wretched counterpart in Bonn.

4. One result of all this, said Kohl, was that when anybody disappeared it was very difficult to replace him. There had been a time when, as soon as there was a vacancy anywhere in even a minor post controlled by the CDU, the telephone in his outer office would be humming with calls from prospective candidates. There were still calls nowadays, but usually to ask whether the Chairman of the Party had any suggestions as to who might take on the job.

5. I asked about the succession to Mertes and Marx, but Kohl did not choose to give anything away. He simply commented that these were two examples of politicians who had had their uses in Bonn but would not have got elected in their own constituencies in a month of Sundays.

F J Strauss

6. I cannot recall how we got on to him, but once again Kohl's comments took the form of a set piece which he had obviously used before. He described his recent private talk with Strauss,

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in which, using the du form, he had confronted the King of Bavaria with the options facing him. If Strauss continued to snipe at the Government of which his Party was a member, then either the FDP would get a double figure score in the Bavarian elections next year, or the CDU would move into Bavaria in its own right and steal some of Strauss' votes. The alternative, to which he implied that Strauss had had no reply, was to pipe down and collaborate with Kohl as he ought to have done in the first place.

Prospects for 1987

7. Kohl gave the Greens 4% to 4.5%, and stuck to this figure when I asked whether he really expected them to do so badly. He said that the SPD score would depend largely on whether they stuck to Vogel as the Chancellor-candidate. Rau would do better, but he wondered whether Rau particularly wanted to play the part which Kohl had played in 1976, losing the general election and condemning himself to a spell in opposition in Bonn which in Kohl's case had lasted 7 years. Kohl spoke as if he had a certain respect for Rau and even some sympathy for him in his predicament.

The generation gap

8. Kohl had read a book, no doubt provided by Bergsdorff, analysing opinions in various age groups in different Western countries. What had struck him was the wide gap between the views of the elderly and young adults in the FRG and Japan. A gap of this size was not to be found in other countries, which led Kohl to conclude that the experience of defeat in 1945 must have something to do with it.

SDI

9. Again in a context which I cannot recall, Kohl declared with great conviction that there was no possibility whatever of the

/Americans

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Americans developing a system which would catch 100% of the Soviet offensive missiles. Whether 20% or 10% got through was not important. It followed that SDI could not be decoupling. What really interested Kohl was the prospect of getting a share of the \$30,000 million which were to be spent by the United States.

Comment

10. Kohl's garrulity is striking. He did about 85% of the talking. I do not think that this is actually a substitute for thought, but it does serve two purposes: it seems to give him reassurance, because he is reciting things he has found to be effective on other occasions and which are convincing to him; and the more he talks, the more he shortens the time available for questions he may not wish to answer, like mine about the successors to Mertes and Marx. Thus loquacity can be a kind of reticence in Kohl's case. All this is part of a certain Schlaueit, which I suppose means something between cleverness and cunning, and which comes out especially when he gets on to the electoral arithmetic which he is so fond of and which he obviously feels so at home with.

JL

J L Bullard

19 July 1985

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