GERMAN/ITALIAN SUMMIT

SUMMARY
1. CONSULTATIONS IN BONN, WITH LARGER MINISTERIAL TEAMS THAN HITHERTO. KOHL PUBLICLY SUPPORTS ITALIAN PARTICIPATION ON G 5, AND HE AND CRAKI ENDORSE REAGAN’S MODIFIED ZERO-ZERO OPTION ON INF.

DETAIL
2. THE 11TH GERMAN/ITALIAN SUMMIT WAS HELD ON 20 FEBRUARY IN BONN. FOR THE FIRST TIME DEFENCE, FINANCE AND AGRICULTURE MINISTERS PARTICIPATED WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

3. ACCORDING TO KUHNA, HEAD OF MEDITERRANEAN DEPARTMENT, AUSWAERTIGES AMT, THE MAIN SUBJECTS COVERED WERE:
   (A) G5. KOHL PUBLICLY PROMISED GERMAN SUPPORT FOR ITALIAN PARTICIPATION ALONG WITH CANADA IN G5 MEETINGS. PRESS REPORTS HIGH-LIGHT THIS POINT. HOWEVER, IN SEPARATE DISCUSSION, STOLTENBERG WAS LESS FORTHCOMING, SAYING ONLY THAT THE ITALIANS SHOULD PLAY A PART IN ALL IMPORTANT MEETINGS APPROPRIATE TO THEIR FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION. KUHNA SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR FROM THIS WHETHER THERE WOULD STILL BE A NEED FOR SEPARATE MEETINGS OF THE FIVE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS.
   (B) EC. THE ITALIANS REASSURED THE GERMANS THAT THEIR REFUSAL TO SIGN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT WAS AIMED SOLELY AT HELPING THE DANISH GOVERNMENT WIN THEIR REFERENDUM.
   (C) ARAB/ISRAEL. ANDREOTTI HAD BEEN MORE CAUTIOUS THAN GENSCHER ON A POSSIBLE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE, SUCH AS TROIKA/ARAB LEAGUE CONTACTS, IN VIEW OF THE AMBIGUOUS POSITION OF KING HUSSEIN. ANDREOTTI THOUGHT THE COMMUNITY SHOULD CONFIN E ITSELF TO PRELIMINARY CONTACTS BEFORE CONSIDERING AN INITIATIVE PROPER.
   (D) STRATEGIC QUESTIONS. KOHL AND CRAKI IN THEIR JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN’S INTENTION TO PUT FORWARD A MODIFIED ZERO-ZERO OPTION TO COUNTER THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS. BOTH INSISTED THAT IT SHOULD ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF CHINESE
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AND JAPANESE CONCERNS AND NOT JUST COVER INF WEST OF THE URALS. IN THEIR OWN DISCUSSIONS GENSDER AND ANDREOTTI HAD AGREED THAT STRATEGIC QUESTIONS SHOULD BE RAISED AT THE NEXT MEETING OF WEU. SDI AND THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS MEANT THAT NATO MUST RE急于 THINK ITS CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES, GIVEN THE WARSAW PACT'S SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. GENSDER ALSO THOUGHT THAT STRATEGIC MATTERS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED, INTER ALIA, AMONG THE TWELVE, TO ENSURE THAT EUROPEAN INTERESTS WERE RESPECTED IN ALL CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING CSCE.

(E) EAST-WEST. GENSDER AND ANDREOTTI HAD AGREED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS FACILITATING A THAW IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS POST-GENEVA. THE SMALLER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR WERE KEEN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE NEW ATMOSPHERE: THE POLISH, BULGARIAN AND ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE ALL TO VISIT BONN IN APRIL/MAY AND GENSDER HOPED TO VISIT POLAND SUBSEQUENTLY. THE EASTERN EUROPEANS ALSO SOUGHT CLOSER EC/CMEA LINKS. ANDREOTTI NOTED AN IMPROVEMENT IN ITALIAN/URSS RELATIONS DESPITE RECENT SPY EXPULSIONS. RELATIONS WITH THE BULGARIANS SHOULD ALSO NOW IMPROVE, GIVEN INDICATIONS THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE PLOT TO KILL THE POPE.

ANDREOTTI SAID THAT THE ITALIANS HAD COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE EASTERN EUROPEANS TO ALLOW JARUZELSKI TO VISIT ROME, BUT WOULD NOT ALLOW THIS BEFORE GORBACHEV'S OWN VISIT.

4. PRESS REPORTS HAVE CONCENTRATED ON THE G5 AND ON JOINT GERMAN-ITALIAN SUPPORT FOR THE MODIFIED ZERO-ZERO OPTION. THERE IS AS YET NO EDITORIAL COMMENT.

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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