

ADVANCE COPIES

15

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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HD/DEFENCE D
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RESIDENT CLERK

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD
S. NPS() }
DACU }
CSI }

15.1.85

CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 77
OF 051445Z MARCH 86

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW
INFO SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON
INFO SAVING LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, PARIS
INFO SAVING REYKJAVIK, ROME, UKDEL STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE
INFO SAVING UKDEL VIENNA

MODUK (FOR DACU)

MIPT: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: US CONSULTATION WITH THE NAC

SUMMARY

1. OVER THE LUNCHEON THAT FOLLOWED THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL DISCUSSION CONCENTRATED ON PUBLIC OPINION, A POSSIBLE CHANGE OF MOOD AMONG THE ALLIES AND SOVIET ATTITUDES AND OBJECTIVES.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL, PICKING UP A POINT MADE IN THE FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, CONTRASTED THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THE US NEGOTIATORS AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND WITH THE REALISM THEY HAD CONVEYED IN THE COUNCIL, AND SUGGESTED THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST WAS SOMEWHAT CONFUSED. POINTS MADE IN THE DISCUSSION INCLUDED THE DANGER THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT PLAY ON PUBLIC OPINION (VIDE KARPOV'S COMMENTS AT THE END OF THE ROUND) TO IMPLY THAT AGREEMENT ON INF AT LEAST WAS WITHIN REACH IF ONLY THE WEST WERE TO SHOW A BIT MORE FLEXIBILITY SEMI COLON AND THE VIEW, EXPRESSED BY KAMPELMAN.

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MORE FLEXIBILITY SEMI COLON AND THE VIEW, EXPRESSED BY KAMPELMAN, THAT, WHILE IT WAS WRONG TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME, IT WAS EQUALLY WRONG, WHEN THE PRESENT POSITION WAS ~~REVEALED~~ AGAINST WHERE WE WERE FIVE YEARS OR EVEN A YEAR AGO, TO BE PESSIMISTIC. KAMPELMAN NOTED A CHANGE OF MOOD IN THE COUNCIL FROM HIS LAST VISIT, WHICH HE FOUND HARD TO DEFINE: PERHAPS IT WAS ONE OF GREATER REALISM NOW THAT AT LEAST IN THE FIELD OF INF THE TWO SIDES, ALTHOUGH STILL FAR APART, APPEARED TO BE TALKING THE SAME SORT OF LANGUAGE.

3. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR ASKED HOW THE US NEGOTIATORS THOUGHT THEIR SOVIET COLLEAGUES WOULD BE REPORTING THE CURRENT POSITION TO MOSCOW. HE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS WE NEEDED A CLEARER ASSESSMENT OF WHAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES ACROSS THE BOARD MIGHT IN FACT BE. GLITMAN THOUGHT THAT NATURALLY THE SOVIET REPORTS WOULD PUT THE SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN THE BEST LIGHT AND THERE MUST BE A RISK THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT US POSITIONS WOULD NOT GET THROUGH: IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT THE US SIDE TOOK SUCH TROUBLE OVER THEIR PREPARED POSITION PAPERS, WHICH WERE HANDED OVER AND WHICH IT MIGHT BE HOPED WOULD BE SUBMITTED UNDOCTORED. AS FOR OBJECTIVES, SENATOR TOWER THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS DEFINITELY INTERESTED IN REDUCTIONS, PROVIDED THAT THEY MAINTAINED THEIR MILITARY SUPERIORITY, WHILE ON THE WESTERN SIDE, THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE, AS HE PUT IT, MUST BE THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY. THE THREE AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS SEEMED TO BE AGREED THAT IN THE RUN UP TO THE CPSU CONGRESS AND WITH THE MOVE OF KVITSINSKY NOW CONFIRMED, THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS MUST HAVE BEEN SUFFERING FROM AN ELEMENT OF PERSONAL SECURITY DURING THIS LAST ROUND.

4. SUMMING UP, CARRINGTON SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT THE PRINCIPAL DANGER FOR THE WEST WAS THAT WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION MIGHT COME TO SEE THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A GAME OF PING-PONG, WITH EACH SIDE DETERMINED TO KEEP THE BALL IN PLAY, RATHER THAN A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.

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FCO PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

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