

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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NAC BRIEFING BY U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATORS, 27 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADORS KAMPELMAN, GLITMAN AND LEHMAN BRIEFED THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON ROUND 5 OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS IN GENEVA. NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS ON SPACE AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS TABLED ON 29 MAY, 3 AND 11 JUNE, WERE A WELCOME SIGN OF A NEW SERIOUSNESS, THOUGH THE PROPOSALS WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. AS THEY STOOD: LINKAGES, SOMETIMES UNCLEAR, REMAINED BETWEEN THE THREE NEGOTIATING AREAS: US CONCERNS ON DESTABILISING SYSTEMS NOT ADDRESSED; AMENDMENTS TO THE ABM TREATY WERE DESIGNED TO CUT INTO THE SDI PROGRAMME. BUT THEY WERE BEING STUDIED CAREFULLY, WITH A VIEW TO A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE POSSIBLY BY THE NEXT ROUND. KARPOV HAD CONSOLIDATED HIS CONTROL OVER THE SOVIET DELEGATION. BOTH THE SOVIET AND US DELEGATIONS HAD TALKED ABOUT THE NEXT SUMMIT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT WOULD TAKE PLACE. LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS IN THE INF TALKS, ESPECIALLY ON ASIAN SS-20'S AND BRITISH/FRENCH FORCES.

DETAIL

2. IN HIS OVERVIEW, KAMPELMAN REFERRED TO THE MODIFIED SOVIET POSITION RESULTING FROM THEIR PROPOSALS OF 29 MAY, 3 JUNE AND 11 JUNE. THIS APPEARED TO REFLECT A SERIOUS EFFORT AT NEGOTIATION, ALTHOUGH THE US COULD NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS WITHOUT CHANGE. THEY WERE BEING SUBJECTED TO CAREFUL STUDY, AND A US RESPONSE WAS IN PREPARATION TAKING THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSALS INTO ACCOUNT. THE BEST SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT US REACTION HAD BEEN IN THE PRESIDENT'S GLASSBORO SPEECH.

3. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS INITIALLY IN PRIVATE. THE PRESIDENT'S 27 MAY ANNOUNCEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT HAD CLEARLY NOT HAD A NEGATIVE IMPACT. THE US

PROPOSALS INITIALLY IN PRIVATE. THE PRESIDENT'S 27 MAY ANNOUNCEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT HAD CLEARLY NOT HAD A NEGATIVE IMPACT. THE US HAD SOUGHT TO CONVEY TO THE SOVIET SIDE THEIR DESIRE FOR A DURABLE FRAMEWORK OF INTERIM RESTRAINT. KARPOV HAD CONSOLIDATED HIS CONTROL, CLEARLY QUOTE CALLING THE SHOTS UNQUOTE IN ALL THREE GROUPS. HE HAD ALSO ACQUIRED RESPONSIBILITY FOR A NEW ARMS CONTROL DIRECTORATE IN THE SOVIET MFA IN MOSCOW, AND HAD RETURNED THERE TWICE DURING THE ROUND. CHERVOV HAD SPENT SEVERAL DAYS IN GENEVA, AND MET ALL THREE US NEGOTIATORS. HIS FIRST MEETING WITH KAMPELMAN HAD BEEN POLEMIC AND UNPLEASANT, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY HE HAD BEEN BUSINESSLIKE.

4. GLITMAN REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD LARGELY AVOIDED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN THE INF GROUP. THERE HAD BEEN NO REPLY TO THE US 24 FEBRUARY PROPOSALS. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ATTEMPTED TO CONCENTRATE ALL DISCUSSION ON THEIR 15 MAY DRAFT AGREEMENT, PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DRAFTING GROUP TO WORK ON IT. GLITMAN'S SUGGESTION THAT THE 1982 TERMS OF REFERENCE SHOULD APPLY, THAT DRAFT US TEXTS SHOULD HAVE EQUAL STATUS, AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE A WORKING GROUP ON VERIFICATION, HAD BEEN RESISTED, THE RUSSIANS SUGGESTING A SUB-GROUP OF EXPERTS ON VERIFICATION, QUOTE IF NECESSARY UNQUOTE. THEIR DESIRE TO ADDRESS VERIFICATION SEQUENTIALLY, RATHER THAN IN PARALLEL WITH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, WAS CLEAR.

5. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD CONTINUED TO EMPHASISE THE REGIONAL CHARACTER OF THEIR PROPOSALS. THEY REPEATED THE PROPOSED ASIAN FREEZE, BUT, HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD ONLY REVEAL THE FIGURE AT WHICH FORCES WOULD BE FROZEN AFTER ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL. IN GENERAL, THEY HAD SHOWN NO SERIOUS INTEREST IN MOVING AWAY FROM THEIR 16 JANUARY POSITION.

6. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD STRESSED THE POTENTIAL OF INCREASED UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS FOR CIRCUMVENTING AN INF TREATY, AND INTRODUCED A DRAFT AGREED STATEMENT ON THIRD COUNTRY FORCES TO BE APPENDED TO THE TREATY. THEY HAD INDICATED THAT A SIGNED TREATY WOULD NOT BE RATIFIED WITHOUT A UK AND FRENCH COMMITMENT ON NO-INCREASE. GLITMAN SAID THAT HE HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US, AND CALLED INTO QUESTION THE VERY BASIS FOR US/SOVIET BILATERAL AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET POSITION WAS INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER STATEMENTS MADE, INCLUDING BY GORBACHEV, ON THE QUESTION OF THIRD COUNTRY FORCES. THE SOVIET SIDE CRITICISED THE US FOR FAILING TO EXERT PRESSURE ON BRITAIN AND FRANCE. GLITMAN HAD STATED THAT THE US HAD A FIRM POLICY ON THE QUESTION OF LRINF SYSTEMS WOULD NOT ARISE IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR ELIMINATION.

7. THE SOVIET SIDE ARGUED THAT THE WARSAW PACT BUDAPEST COMMUNIQUE MADE THE QUESTION OF AN SRINF FREEZE IRRELEVANT. (IN SUBSEQUENT CLARIFICATION, GLITMAN SAID THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT THEY WOULD BEGIN LOOKING AT A FREEZE ON SRINF AFTER THE QUESTION OF LRINF HAD BEEN SETTLED. SRINF WERE THEREFORE LINKED TO STAGE 4-1 OF THEIR 16 JANUARY PROPOSAL.)

8. LEHMAN REPORTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS IN THE STRATEGIC GROUP UNTIL THE SOVIET SIDE TABLED THEIR QUOTE COMPROMISE PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERIM SOLUTION UNQUOTE ON 11 JUNE. THE BASIC PROVISIONS (AS ALREADY REPORTED) WERE A LIMIT OF 1,600 SNDVS, DEFINED AS ICBMS, SLBMS, HEAVY BOMBER, AND SUBMARINES CARRYING LONG RANGE (600 KMS) SLCMS; A LIMIT OF 8,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DEFINED AS BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, SLCMS, AND BOMBER WEAPONS OF ALL KINDS; NO MORE THAN 60 PERCENT OF WEAPONS ON ANY ONE TYPE OF DELIVERY VEHICLE; AND A BAN OR LIMITS ON TYPES TESTED AFTER AN AGREED DATE. NO DURATION FOR THE LIMITATIONS HAD BEEN PROPOSED, BUT THE REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE OVER 5-6 YEARS. THE PROPOSALS WERE LINKED TO THE 29 MAY CONDITIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE ABM TREATY.

9. ALTHOUGH SO-CALLED FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS HAD BEEN DROPPED FROM THOSE ACCOUNTED FOR ABOVE, THE PROPOSALS WERE STILL LINKED TO A PROVISION FOR NO INCREASE IN SUCH SYSTEMS, AND NO LRINF MISSILES TO BE DEPLOYED OUTSIDE EUROPE. AN INF AGREEMENT AS SUCH COULD BE PURSUED SEPARATELY. BOHT LEHMAN AND GLITMAN STRESSED THEIR STRONG MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE CONTINUED LINKAGE OF INF SYSTEMS TO AN AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC FORCES. ALBERT IN DIFFERENT TERMS. AT NO

MESSAGE ABOUT THE CONTINUED LINKAGE OF INF SYSTEMS TO AN AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC FORCES, ALBEIT IN DIFFERENT TERMS. AT NO POINT HAD THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSED IN THE CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC FORCES ANY FORM OF LIMITATION ON THEIR OWN INTERMEDIATE RANGE FORCES. SINCE THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY REFERRED TO DEPLOYMENT LEVELS AT THE END OF 1985, IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WERE IN FACT DEMANDING A REDUCTION IN US LRINF AS A CONDITION OF AGREEMENT TO THEIR STRATEGIC FORCE PROPOSALS.

10. IN ADDITION TO THIS, LEHMAN OUTLINED A NUMBER OF OTHER SHORTCOMINGS IN THE SOVIET PROPOSALS, INCLUDING: THE INCREASE IN OVERALL NUMBERS, ALLOWING THE RUSSIANS TO RETAIN A MORE CAPABLE FORCE, IN PARTICULAR OF ICBMS; THE FAILURE TO ADDRESS US CONCERNS ON STABILISING AND DESTABILISING SYSTEMS, IN PARTICULAR THE CONTINUED EQUATION OF EG SS-18 WARHEADS WITH AIRCRAFT WEAPONS; AND THE FAILURE TO INCLUDE THROW-WEIGHT AS A UNIT OF ACCOUNT. NONETHELESS, THE US HAVE ASSURED THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THEIR PROPOSALS WOULD RECEIVE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

11. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ADMITTED THAT THEIR IDEAS ON VERIFICATION OF MOBILE ICBMS, AND SLICMS, NEEDED FURTHER THOUGHT AND ELABORATION, ALTHOUGH THEY APPEARED TO BE PLAYING US IDEAS ON INF VERIFICATION BACK AT THEM IN THE STRATEGIC GROUP, WHILE REFUSING TO DISCUSS THEM IN THE INF GROUP.

12. INTRODUCING HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF 29 MAY AND 3 JUNE, KAMPELMAN REFERRED BACK TO THEIR PROPOSED PARTIAL MEASURES TOWARDS THE BANNING OF SPACE STRIKE ARMS PUT FORWARD IN ROUND 4. THESE WERE THE BANNING OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN SPACE, A BAN ON ASATS, AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ABM TREATY. DETAILED PROPOSALS ON ALL THREE HAD NOW BEEN TABLED, BUT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF A CONCEPT OF QUOTE SPACE-EARTH WEAPONS UNQUOTE THERE WERE NO NEW ELEMENTS IN THE FIRST TWO.

13. ON THE THIRD, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PROPOSED AN ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL, IN EFFECT AMENDING ARTICLE 15 OF THE ABM TREATY, INVOLVING A NO-WITHDRAWAL COMMITMENT FOR A PERIOD OF 15-20 YEARS. SUCH A COMMITMENT ALSO IMPLIED UNWAVERING COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY, LINKED TO AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND IDENTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF ITS PROVISIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, NEW DEFINITIONS RELATING TO THE ARTICLE V PROHIBITION OF SPACE-BASED ABM SYSTEMS WOULD BE REQUIRED. THESE DEFINITIONS WOULD SEEK TO DEFINE THE CUT-OFF POINT BETWEEN PERMISSIBLE AND NON-PERMISSIBLE RESEARCH AT THE STAGE OF QUOTE MOCK-UP UNQUOTE OR QUOTE TEST MODEL UNQUOTE (NEITHER OF WHICH, KAMPELMAN SAID, WERE DEFINITIONS FOUND IN THE ABM TREATY). THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD ALSO SEEK TO REDEFINE THE TERM QUOTE COMPONENT UNQUOTE.

14. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE EFFECT OF THESE CHANGES WOULD BE TO RESTRICT SDI ACTIVITY AT A MUCH EARLIER STAGE OF RESEARCH THAN THAT CURRENTLY REQUIRED BY THE ABM TREATY. THERE WAS POSSIBLY SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION: IT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT THE 11 JUNE PROPOSALS WERE LINKED TO BOTH THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL ON NON-WITHDRAWAL, AND THE REVISED DEFINITIONS, OR THE FORMER ONLY. KAMPELMAN HAD TRIED TO CLARIFY THIS, BUT HAD RECEIVED AMBIGUOUS ANSWERS. KAMPELMAN HAD TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT THE ABM TREATY HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN AGREED WITH THE PROSPECT OF REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC FORCES IN MIND, WITHOUT IT BEING THOUGHT THAT ANY SUPPLEMENTARY OBLIGATIONS WERE NECESSARY. THIS ASPIRATION HAD REMAINED UNFULFILLED. WHEN HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE TREATY IMPLIED AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A TWO THIRDS MAJORITY IN THE US SENATE, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD DENIED THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO AMEND THE TREATY. HE ALSO SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE US APPROACH BASED ON CO-OPERATION: IN THE PAST ROUND THE SOVIET SIDE HAD BEEN READY TO TALK ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE ABM TREATY IN THE OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP, WHICH HE CONSIDERED A POSITIVE TREND.

15. ELABORATING ON THESE POINTS IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM MYSELF AND HANSENT (FRG) KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE TERM QUOTE MOCK UP UNQUOTE APPEARED NEITHER IN THE ABM TREATY NOR IN THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE US SIDE HAD DEFINED QUOTE PROTOTYPE

AND HANSENT (FRG) KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THE TERM QUOTE MOCK UP UNQUOTE APPEARED NEITHER IN THE ABM TREATY NOR IN THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE US SIDE HAD DEFINED QUOTE PROTOTYPE UNQUOTE AS THE STAGE AT WHICH A DESIGN, IF SUBSEQUENTLY APPROVED, COULD BE ESSENTIALLY REPRODUCED BY THE PRODUCTION PROCESS. THIS HAD BEEN DONE IN THE CONTEXT OF DEFINING QUOTE DEVELOPMENT UNQUOTE. ANYTHING MORE RESTRICTIVE, SUCH AS IMPLIED BY QUOTE MOCK UP UNQUOTE, WOULD CLEARLY BE SEEN BY THE US AS AN AMENDMENT TO THE TREATY. IT WAS A BLATANT SOVIET ATTEMPT TO CUT THE SDI PROGRAMME. HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIET SIDE THAT IF THEY WISHED TO AMEND THE ABM TREATY, THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS, AND MIGHT HAVE AMENDMENTS OF ITS OWN TO PUT FORWARD. KAMPELMAN ALSO HAD SOME MISGIVINGS ABOUT AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 15 TO EXTEND THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD TO 15-20 YEARS. ARTICLE 15 PROVIDED FOR 6 MONTHS NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL IN RESPONSE TO QUOTE EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS JEOPARDISING A PARTY'S SUPREME INTEREST UNQUOTE. HE WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER ANY NATION COULD COMMIT ITSELF TO WAITING AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF YEARS IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES: IT WOULD BE A DIFFICULT POINT WITH THE SENATE. BUT HE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE WORDING.

16. IN THEIR INTERVENTIONS, ALL PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO SPOKE WELCOMED THE NEW SIGNS OF A SERIOUS SOVIET ATTEMPT AT NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH MOST ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SHORTCOMINGS EXISTED IN THEIR NEW PROPOSALS. CURIEN (FRANCE) MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF THANKING GLATMAN FOR THE STANCE HE HAD TAKEN ON THIRD COUNTRY FORCES. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (NETHERLANDS) RECALLED HIS FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT HALIFAX ON SALT 111 INTERIM RESTRAINTS.

17. ON THE TIMING OF A US RESPONSE, KAMPELMAN SAID THAT THIS COULD POSSIBLY COME BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WAS NO US INTENT TO DELAY, ALTHOUGH SUBSTANCE COULD NOT BE SACRIFICED TO TIMING. SO FAR AS A SUMMIT WAS CONCERNED, THE US TEAM HAD MADE A POINT OF REFERRING TO IT WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS IN TERMS WHICH ASSUMED IT WOULD TAKE PLACE. NONE OF THE SOVIET TEAM, INCLUDING KARPOV AND CHERVOV, HAD SOUGHT TO QUESTION OR CHALLENGE THIS.

18. FULL TEXTS OF OPENING STATEMENTS FOLLOW BY BAG FOR FCO, MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW.

GRAHAM

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FCO PASS SAYING ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON
LUXEMBOURG MADRID OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK ROME UKDEL STOCKHOLM
UKDEL VIENNA UKMIS GENEVA

UBLNAN 0704