



ms

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

The President's message
conveys the gist of
what Paul Nitze
will say to you
tomorrow night.

On SDI, what is
proposed is conceptually
what you suggested - i.e.
give an assurance of what
will not happen for a
specific period. But the
period is very short, &
it is too easy to
move beyond it. It also

needs to extra
element of strengthening
the ABM Treaty.

CDP

21/7.

ADVANCE COPIES

18

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

IMMEDIATE

4

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR RATFORD
MR ~~WILSON~~ DAUNT
MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) }
D. NPS () } MOD
DACU }
CSI }

HD/DEFENCE D
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

SECRET

FM BONN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 632

OF 211415Z JULY 86

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MODUK FOR DACU

WASHINGTON TELNO 1879: US RESPONSE TO SOVIET GENEVA ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

SUMMARY

1. NITZE IN BONN. GENSCHER GENERALLY CONTENT WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS BUT WOULD WELCOME A MORE DETAILED POSITION ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT.

DETAIL

2. NITZE SAW GENSCHER AT THE AIRPORT HERE ON 20 JULY FOR ABOUT HALF AN HOUR. HE ALSO SAW TELTSCHIK.

3. AUSWAERTIGES AMT (HARTMANN) HAVE TOLD ME THAT NITZE WAS EVIDENTLY VERY TIRED AFTER HIS FLIGHT AND DID LITTLE MORE THAN READ OUT SPEAKING NOTES WHICH ADDED NOTHING TO THE CONTENT OF THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN WHICH CHANCELLOR KOHL HAS RECEIVED, WHICH IS NO DOUBT IN VERY SIMILAR TERMS TO THE MESSAGE SENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

4. AT OFFICIAL LEVEL, THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS ARE MUCH AS WAS TO BE EXPECTED AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE INTER AGENCY DEBATE IN WASHINGTON AND THAT THEY MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO MAKE A SUMMIT POSSIBLE.

5. GENSCHER HAD BASED HIMSELF ON THE TERMS OF A DRAFT LETTER FROM KOHL TO REAGAN WHICH WAS OVERTAKEN BY NITZE'S VISIT. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE AMERICANS TO TAKE UP THE "INTERESTING" SOVIET APPROACH, WHICH AMOUNTED TO AN ACCEPTANCE OF SDI RESEARCH. HE HAD WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD ENSURE THAT SEVEN AND A HALF YEARS ELAPSED BEFORE THE ABM TREATY COULD CEASE TO HAVE EFFECT. SUCH A TIME LIMITED SOLUTION WAS A GOOD WAY OF OVERCOMING THE PRESENT STALEMATE AND SHOULD REMOVE THE SOVIET UNION'S EXCUSE FOR NOT NEGOTIATING START REDUCTIONS. HE HAD ASKED ABOUT THE "BENEFITS" WHICH COULD BE AGREED DURING THE TWO YEAR NEGOTIATING PERIOD. NITZE SAID THESE WERE NOT NECESSARILY TECHNOLOGICAL. GENSCHER HAD ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE TESTING REFERRED

WAY OF OVERCOMING THE PRESENT STALEMATE AND SHOULD REMOVE THE SOVIET UNION'S EXCUSE FOR NOT NEGOTIATING START REDUCTIONS. HE HAD ASKED ABOUT THE "BENEFITS" WHICH COULD BE AGREED DURING THE TWO YEAR NEGOTIATING PERIOD. NITZE SAID THESE WERE NOT NECESSARILY TECHNOLOGICAL. GENSCHER HAD ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE TESTING REFERRED TO IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE DID NOT GO BEYOND THE ABMT. NITZE HAD SAID THAT SOME TYPES OF TEST WERE CONSISTENT EVEN WITH THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES CONTINUED TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO ADOPT THE OTHER INTERPRETATION. GENSCHER EMPHASISED THAT THE FRG CONTINUED TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION.

6. GENSCHER HAD NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S SUGGESTION THAT THE FRENCH AND BRITISH DETERRENTS COULD BE BROUGHT INTO DISCUSSION AFTER 50 PER CENT START REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. GENSCHER SAID THAT THESE SYSTEMS HAD THEIR "OWN SIGNIFICANCE". HE HAD RESISTED SOVIET WOOING ON THIS ISSUE AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO DURING HIS CURRENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. NITZE ADMITTED THAT THIS PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH US.

7. GENSCHER WELCOMED THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON INF.

8. GENSCHER HAD CRITICISED THE PASSAGE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS AND HAD URGED THAT MORE DETAILED REFERENCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED TO THE NEED FOR PROGRESS IN THE CDE AND MBFR FORA.

9. AUSWAERTIGES AMT DID NOT THINK THIS LAST SUGGESTION WOULD BE A DIFFICULT ONE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION. BUT TIME WAS SHORT IF THE PRESIDENT WAS TO MAKE HIS ANNOUNCEMENT ON 25 JULY. KOHL WOULD HOWEVER BE ADVISED TO MAKE THE POINT IN THE REPLY TO REAGAN WHICH WAS NOW BEING PREPARED.

WILLIAMS

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BPLNAN 1637

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