

ADVANCE COPIES

18

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS | EAST WEST US | SOVIET RELATIONS

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR RATFORD  
MR ~~W~~ DAUNT  
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RR BUCHA  
FM VIENNA TO FCOLN  
041924Z NOV  
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM VIENNA  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 168

OF 041924Z NOVEMBER 1986

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA  
INFO ROUTINE PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, SOFIA, WARSAW, BUCHAREST  
INFO SAVING EC POSTS

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

BILATERAL MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER: ARMS CONTROL SUMMARY

SECRETARY OF STATE URGES REMOVAL OF LINKAGE BETWEEN SDI AND START/INF SEMICOLON STRESSES THAT REDUCTION BEYOND 50 PER CENT OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY AGREEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. SHEVARDNAZDE RESTATES LINKAGE WITH SDI, ADMITTING CHANGE IN SOVIET POSITION, URGES BRITAIN AND FRANCE TO JOIN IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROCESS, AND STATES READINESS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES ON BASIS OF BUDAPEST PROPOSALS. RUSSIANS READY TO ACCEPT BRITISH PROPOSAL ON CW AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD ONE HOUR WITH SHEVARDNAZDE THIS MORNING. THIS TELEGRAM RECORDS DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. MIFT RECORDS DISCUSSIONS ON OTHER MATTERS.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD FOLLOWING THE REYKJAVIK MEETING. WE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PUSH FORWARD ENERGETICALLY TO REACH AGREEMENTS IN SPECIFIC AREAS. WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A LINK BETWEEN SDI AND OTHER

ENERGETICALLY TO REACH AGREEMENTS IN SPECIFIC AREAS. WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A LINK BETWEEN INF AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL AREAS, AND SDI. WE BELIEVED THAT AN AGREEMENT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE ON A ZERO-ZERO BASIS ON INF IN ITS OWN RIGHT. WE WELCOMED THE PROSPECT OF 50 PER CENT CUTS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND ALSO THE STEP BY STEP PATH FOR A DIMINUTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING.

4. HOWEVER, REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST BE MATCHED BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. VERIFICATION REMAINED OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. WE WELCOMED GORBACHEV'S AGREEMENT IN REYKJAVIK THAT FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES WERE NOT RELEVANT TO DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

5. SHEVARDNAZDE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS REGARDED THE SITUATION AS HAVING CHANGED QUALITATIVELY IN REYKJAVIK. THE SOVIET UNION'S VIEW HAD THEREFORE ALSO CHANGED. THIS WAS WHY THE SOVIET UNION INSISTED THAT ALL PARTS OF THE EQUATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE ABM TREATY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A PACKAGE. AT REYKJAVIK FOR THE FIRST TIME IT HAD BEEN ESSENTIALLY AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES THAT ALL NUCLEAR ARSENALS SHOULD BE VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED BY 1996. THIS INCLUDED PROGRESS TO ABOLISH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN TWO STAGES. ALSO FOR THE FIRST TIME BASIC AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE ELIMINATION OF MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE, AND ON HOW TO RESOLVE THE ASIAN ANGLE. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIET UNION HAD AGREED TO SET ASIDE THE QUESTION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH ARSENALS. REYKJAVIK WAS ALSO THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1972 THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED ON A PERIOD OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM.

6. THERE WAS THEREFORE A NEW SITUATION. THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DEPARTURE FROM WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED AT REYKJAVIK. THEY HOPED AND EXPECTED THAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE WOULD ADOPT MORE REASONABLE POSITIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW SITUATION. ALL COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR POWERS, SHOULD EVALUATE THEIR OWN PLACE IN THE HISTORICAL PROCESS OF RIDDING THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GIVEN THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE NOT ONE OF THE MAJOR FORCES, THE REMOVAL OF SOVIET AND US INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES FROM EUROPE WOULD MEAN THAT THE SUBSTANTIVE FORCES THERE HAD BEEN ELIMINATED. HE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED A DIFFERENT REACTION TO THIS FROM THE UK: FOR INSTANCE THE UK COULD HAVE SAID THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD JOIN IN THE PROCESS, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE PERIOD 1988-1992. IT COULD ALSO HAVE SAID THAT IT WOULD ELIMINATE ITS BALLISTIC MISSILES, OR WOULD NOT PROCEED WITH RENEWAL OF ITS SYSTEMS. SO COULD THE FRENCH. THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEMANDED THAT ALL NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD TAKE PART.

7. THE SOVIET UNION AGREED ON THE NEED TO DEAL WITH CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE WARSAW PACT ALREADY HAD A PROGRAMME WHICH HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD FOR DISCUSSION, AND THEY BELIEVED THAT THERE WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE FROM NATO WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A REDUCTION. THEY HAD ALSO SAID THAT MILITARY DOCTRINES SHOULD BE REVISED, SIGNIFYING THEIR READINESS TO DISCUSS THIS.

8. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS THERE WERE GOOD PROSPECTS OF PROGRESS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO TAKE THE BRITISH PROPOSALS AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

9. THE MAIN OBSTACLE REMAINED SDI, AND EVERYONE SHOULD MAKE THEIR ATTITUDE TO THIS PROGRAMME CLEAR. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD HIM THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT OBJECT TO AN SDI PROGRAMME OF AN EXCLUSIVELY RESEARCH CHARACTER. THE SOVIET

SDI PROGRAMME OF AN EXCLUSIVELY RESEARCH CHARACTER. THE SOVIET UNION HAD LISTENED TO US AND HAD THEREFORE AGREED TO A SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMME, AND TO A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF QUOTE LABORATORY RESEARCH UNQUOTE, WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN LABORATORIES, USING THE LATTER TERM IN ITS BROADEST SENSE. THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE PRODUCTION OF MODELS, MOCK UPS AND PROTOTYPES OF ABM SYSTEMS, INCLUDING SPACE SYSTEMS. THIS WAS A GESTURE TO THE PRESIDENT IN VIEW OF HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE RECOGNISED THAT REYKJAVIK HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT MEETING. HE REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS ON SDI WITHIN THE ABMT FRAMEWORK, BOTH ON THE DURATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ABMT, AND ON DEFINITIONS OF RESEARCH. OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD PROPOSED A NARROWER RATHER THAN BROADER DEFINITION OF RESEARCH.

11. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WE WERE GLAD THE RUSSIANS WERE READY TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS ON THE BASIS OF OUR PROPOSAL.

12. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THERE SHOULD ALSO BE AGREEMENT AND RESTRAINT ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED APART FROM THE QUESTION OF IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. THERE WAS A SERIOUS IMPBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES NOW. THE BUDAPEST PROPOSALS HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD ON THE BASIS THAT THERE WAS ALREADY A BALANCE; WE STRONGLY DISAGREED. TO MAKE DISCUSSION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS POSSIBLE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO GO MUCH FURTHER THAN IT HAD IN THE PAST ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION. THIS HAD BEEN THE PROBLEM ON MFBR. AGREEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS THE ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE OF GOING BEYOND A 50 PER CENT CUT IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS. OTHERWISE IT WOULD NOT BRING SECURITY TO EUROPE.

13. SHEVARDNAZDE REPEATED THAT SOONER OR LATER THE UK WOULD HAVE TO SAY WHAT POSITION WE INTENDED TO TAKE ON THE PROCESS OF ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THIS WAS WHY WE HAD STRESSED THE VITAL RELEVANCE TO THIS OF REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. SHEVARDNAZDE SUGGESTED THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO TAKE A CLEAR LINE ON OUR ATTITUDE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE POSITION AT REYKJAVIK HAD BEEN CLEAR. IF THERE COULD BE AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND ON INF ON A ZERO-ZERO BASIS, THEN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD START NEGOTIATIONS ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS (THOSE LESS THAN 1,000 KMS IN RANGE). THE ELIMINATION OF INF WOULD TAKE YEARS, AND WOULD GIVE PLENTY OF TIME TO FIND A SOLUTION ON TACTICAL WEAPONS. BUT HE AGREED THAT WITH THE ELIMINATION OF INF (AND EVENTUALLY BRITISH BALLISTIC MISSILES TOO, WHICH IN HIS VIEW WE WOULD COME TO AGREE AS A LOGICAL STEP), CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BECAME OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.

14. THE SOVIET UNION COULD COUNT AS WELL AS WE COULD, AND THEY DID NOT SEE AN IMBALANCE. THEY HAD PUT FORWARD THEIR CONCEPT OF CUT-BACKS IN EUROPE, INCLUDING CENTRAL EUROPE, AND HAD PROPOSED AN EFFECTIVE METHOD OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AND VERIFICATION BOTH OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS AND OF RESIDUAL FORCES AND ACTIVITIES. THEY AWAITED A RESPONSE FROM NATO. IN ADDITION CORBACHEV HAD PROPOSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE WORKING GROUPS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT TO TALK ABOUT TECHNICAL DETAILS OF FORCE SIZES AND WEAPONS. NATO SHOULD SPEED UP ITS RESPONSE TO THIS. SUCH WORKING GROUPS WERE NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR OVERALL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS; THERE WOULD NEED TO BE A CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE NNA, BUT WORK SHOULD START QUICKLY

TO BE A CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE NNA, BUT WORK SHOULD START QUICKLY.

15. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE IN FAVOUR OF CONSTRUCTIVE WORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE; THE NEUTRALS NEEDED TO BE INCLUDED, BUT SENSIBLE DISCUSSION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MUST BE BASED ON THE FORCES OF THE TWO ALLIANCES. OUR POSITION WAS IN SOME WAYS ANALOGOUS TO THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION; THEY SAID THAT AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS COULD NOT BE REACHED IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON SDI; OUR VIEW WAS THAT SUCH AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. DISCUSSION OF THIS NEEDED TO START FROM RECOGNITION OF THE SERIOUS IMPBALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. SHEVARDNADZE REPEATED THAT HIS EXPERTS HAD PERSUADED HIM THAT THERE WAS ALREADY ROUGH PARITY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WAS THIS FALSE THESIS WHICH HAD PREVENTED PROGRESS IN MBFR. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE EXPERT WORKING GROUPS SHOULD LOOK AT THE LEVEL OF TROOPS, TANKS, AIRCRAFT, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS ETC. THEIR VIEW WAS THAT TAKING THE EQUATION OVERALL, THERE WAS PARITY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT NEITHER OUR EXPERTS NOR OUR PUBLIC BELIEVED THIS. YOU DID NOT NEED TO BE AN EXPERT TO SEE A VERY SERIOUS IMPBALANCE. SHEVARDNADZE CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS A SERIOUS NEED TO TACKLE THESE DIFFERENT VIEW POINTS IN EXPERT WORKING GROUPS.

16. NOW SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

O'NEILL

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