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Zyghis

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PVS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR RATFORD
MR ~~DAUNT~~ DAUNT
MR FEARN

MR ~~POWELL~~, NO 10 DOWNING ST
MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD
P. NPS }
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SHULTZ/ SHEVARDNAZDE: NATO BRIEFING BY SHULTZ

SUMMARY

1. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT COME TO VIENNA READY TO MAKE SERIOUS PROGRESS AFTER REYKJAVIK. MUCH TIME HAD BEEN SPENT ON DISPUTING THE REYKJAVIK RECORD, NOTABLY OVER THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS/BALLISTIC MISSILES BY 1996. BUT SOME PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, AND HE WAS PREPARED TO BE PATIENT.

DETAIL

2. MR RENTON ATTENDED THE BRIEFING WHICH SHULTZ GAVE TO NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS FOR AN HOUR YESTERDAY EVENING, ON HIS TALKS WITH SHEVARDNAZDE ON 5 NOVEMBER (THREE HOURS) AND 6 NOVEMBER (TWO HOURS). SHULTZ OPENED BY SAYING THAT HE COULD NOT REPORT ANYTHING LIKE THE KIND OF PROGRESS THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SEEN. THE US HAD BROUGHT TO VIENNA ITS QUOTE FIRST TEAM UNQUOTE, READY TO CARRY FORWARD THE ISSUES DISCUSSED AT REYKJAVIK, BUT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS EVIDENTLY NOT READY TO RESPOND. THE DISCUSSIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AND BILATERAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES HAD NEVERTHELESS BEEN SATISFACTORY, AND HE WAS READY TO BE PATIENT. ON THE BILATERAL PROGRAMME OF COMMON ACTIVITY WORKED OUT AT REYKJAVIK, AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON JOINT ACTIVITY IN THE CIVILIAN SPACE SECTOR, AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD PRODUCED PROPOSALS FOR WORK ON TRANSPORTATION AND ENERGY.

ARMS CONTROL

3. ON ARMS CONTROL THE SOVIET SIDE HAD COME TO VIENNA APPARENTLY DETERMINED TO QUOTE PICK A FIGHT UNQUOTE OVER WHAT HAD TENTATIVELY BEEN ACHIEVED AT REYKJAVIK, AND NOTABLY OVER WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED AS POSSIBLE IN THE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC FIELD. THEY HAD SOUGHT TO COMPRESS EVERYTHING THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID AT REYKJAVIK INTO AN OBLIGATION TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY 1996. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET UNION HAD INSISTED ON CONCENTRATING DISCUSSION ON THE ARM TREATY, WHERE THEY APPEARED TO WISH TO PUT ALL POSSIBLE WEIGHT ON CONFIRMING RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC DEFENCE TO THE LABORATORY, WHATEVER THAT MEANT. THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT NOW ATTEMPT TO ARGUE

STRATEGIC DEFENCE TO THE LABORATORY, WHATEVER THAT MEANT. THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT NOW ATTEMPT TO ARGUE THAT LABORATORIES COULD EXIST IN SPACE, FOR EXAMPLE, AS WELL AS IN A RESEARCH INSTITUTE. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WAS THAT THE TERMS OF THE ABM TREATY SHOULD CONTINUE TO APPLY AND TO BE OBSERVED. THERE WAS NO SIGN THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY AT PRESENT FOR THE KIND OF DIALOGUE THAT WOULD BE NEEDED TO MAKE PROGRESS ON SDI.

4. DISCUSSION ON CONTROL OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS HAD CENTRED ON THE QUESTIONS OF WHETHER THE SECOND FIVE YEAR STAGE OF DISARMAMENT SHOULD APPLY TO ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR TO BALLISTIC MISSILES ONLY, AND THE OBLIGATIONS TO APPLY TO THE ABM TREATY AFTER TEN-YEAR EXTENSION. THE SOVIET UNION HAD SOUGHT TO DISTORT THE RECORD, AND MUCH TIME HAD BEEN SPENT OVER THIS. KAMPELMANN COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD SAID THAT IT WANTED TO QUOTE STRENGTHEN UNQUOTE THE ABM TREATY, BUT THIS IN EFFECT AMOUNTED TO SEEKING AMENDMENTS. SHULTZ SAID THAT SHEVARDNAZDE HAD NEVER BROUGHT UP THE ISSUE OF LINKAGE, HOWEVER, DESPITE THE IMPRESSION THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN SEEKING TO GIVE TO THE PRESS SINCE REYKJAVIK. MUCH WOULD NOW DEPEND ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION AT THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE NOW TO RESUME AT GENEVA. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD UNDERTAKEN TO TABLE THESE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD PROBABLY EMBODY ITS VERSION OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED AT REYKJAVIK. MEANWHILE, WORK WAS ALSO CONTINUING ON THE POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR RISKS CENTRES. IN THE CONVENTIONAL SPHERE, HE HAD EMPHASISED TO SHEVARDNAZDE THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS BOTH ON CW AND ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THEIR RELEVANCE TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AND HAD SAID THAT CONCRETE DECISIONS BY THE ALLIANCE ON THE FUTURE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS MUST FIRST AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF THE WORK SET IN HAND AT HALIFAX. THIS APPLIED ALSO TO THE SOVIET SUGGESTION OF WORKING GROUPS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS.

5. MR RENTON ASKED SHULTZ TO COMMENT ON THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY 1996. WAS IT SERIOUS, OR ONLY TACTICAL? SHULTZ SAID HE DID NOT THINK COMPLETE ELIMINATION WAS POSSIBLE BY 1996. IT WAS ALWAYS NECESSARY TO BEAR IN MIND THAT PEACE CONTINUED TO DEPEND ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, AND THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON AGREEING ON REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS THIS WAS BECAUSE THE ALLIANCE POSSESSED AN IMPORTANT CAPABILITY. ROS RIDGWAY ADDED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PROPOSED THAT BEFORE THE END OF THE 10 YEAR PERIOD AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED ON HOW TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE ELIMINATION, AND A DATE SET FOR THAT. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SET SUCH DATES NOW. PROGRESS WOULD FIRST BE NEEDED ON A SOUND CONVENTIONAL BALANCE, THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND A BETTER INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THIS SHOWED WHERE THE QUOTE NEGOTIATING SPACE UNQUOTE LAY, IF EVER THE DIALOGUE GOT SERIOUS. WE MUST BE PATIENT.

TERRORISM

6. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD SHEVARDNAZDE THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD DISMISS THE DAMNING EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WHICH HAD BEEN UNCOVERED BY THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF JUSTICE, TO WHICH HE PAID WARM TRIBUTE. INVESTIGATION OF THE KARACHI AIRPORT INCIDENT WAS ALSO PRODUCING INCREASING EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT. SHEVARDNAZDE'S RESPONSE HAD NOT BEEN SATISFACTORY.

7. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ALSO IT WAS NECESSARY THAT WE SHOULD ALL CONTINUE TO CONFRONT ASSAD. THE UNITED STATES HAD WITHDRAWN ITS AMBASSADOR FROM DAMASCUS, AND WAS CONSULTING ITS ALLIES ON WHAT FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE.

FURTHER SUMMIT

8. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, SHULTZ SAID THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN RAISED. FOR WHATEVER REASON, GORBACHEV WAS CLEARLY RELUCTANT TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES AT THE PRESENT TIME.

HUMAN RIGHTS

9. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE KNEW SOVIET GOVERNMENT CLEARLY HAD A DIFFERENT APPROACH FROM ITS PREDECESSORS. WE MUST EXPECT IT TO BE MORE AGGRESSIVE AND LEGALISTIC IN ATTACKING THE HUMAN RIGHTS

9. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE KNEW SOVIET GOVERNMENT CLEARLY HAD A DIFFERENT APPROACH FROM ITS PREDECESSORS. WE MUST EXPECT IT TO BE MORE AGGRESSIVE AND LEGALISTIC IN ATTACKING THE HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE OF THE WEST. BUT PROGRESS WAS ALSO BEING MADE. THE SOVIET UNION NOW ACCEPTED THE STANDING OF THE WEST TO RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS CASES IN THE SOVIET UNION. PROPOSALS FIRST RAISED AT REYKJAVIK PROVIDING FOR ONGOING CONTACTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, HAD BEEN CONFIRMED IN VIENNA. THE SOVIET UNION HAD RESISTED THE SETTING UP OF A HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, BUT THERE WOULD NOW BE A BILATERAL REVIEW COMMISSION MEETING REGULARLY, PERHAPS QUARTERLY. THIS WOULD COVER ALL THE RELEVANT ELEMENTS. THE COMMISSION WOULD BE BILATERAL, BUT HE HOPED ALL OTHER ALLIANCE COUNTRIES WOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIET UNION.

10 SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSAL FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW SHOULD BE NOT DISMISSED AUTOMATICALLY. BUT WE SHOULD ASK IF NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS WOULD ALSO BE FREE TO BE THERE, WHETHER DISSIDENTS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO BE PRESENT IN MOSCOW, AND HOW FREE THE SOVIET MEDIA WOULD BE TO COVER THE PROCEEDINGS. HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PERMIT AN OPEN MEETING, BUT THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT UP AGAINST THE PROBLEM THEY HAD CREATED FOR THEMSELVES. KAMPELMANN ADDED THAT IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOW ADOPTING WESTERN TERMINOLOGY. IT WAS DOING THIS TO TRY TO DEFUSCATE THE PROBLEM, BUT WE MUST USE IT TO FORCE THEM DOWN THE ROAD OF ADAPTING THEIR PRACTICE TO WESTERN STANDARDS.

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