

ADVANCE COPIES

18

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR RUTFORD
MR ~~FALL~~
MR FEARN

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) }
B. NPS() } MOD
DACU }
CSI }

HD/DEFENCE D
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET D

IMMEDIATE

RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2858
OF 110245ZZ NOVEMBER 86
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, MODUK
INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW

MODUK FOR DACU

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS IN GENEVA

SUMMARY.

1. NO PROGRESS IN SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE VIENNA MEETINGS.
2. RUSSIANS TABLE IN GENEVA COMPREHENSIVE NEW PROPOSALS BASED ON SOVIET REYKJAVIK POSITIONS. TIGHT LINKAGE BETWEEN ALL ELEMENTS. OFFERS (A) TO HALVE THE SOVIET HEAVY MISSILE FORCE, AND (B) TO ACCEPT GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON RESIDUAL ASIAN SS20S THE ONLY POSITIVE ASPECTS IMMEDIATELY APPARENT. RUSSIANS ENVISAGE A UK ROLE IN A SECOND ROUND (POST 50 PERCENT) OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS, AND IN NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS.
3. A PAUSE NOW LIKELY BUT NOT CLEAR FOR HOW LONG.

DETAIL.

4. OUR ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS CONFIRM THAT NO PROGRESS WAS MADE ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AT THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETINGS IN VIENNA ON 5-6 NOVEMBER AND HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO THE ACCOUNT SHULTZ GAVE TO NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS (VIENNA TELNO 186).
5. THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAM IN GENEVA TABLED ON 7 NOVEMBER A COMPREHENSIVE NEW SET OF PROPOSALS BASED ON SOVIET POSITIONS AT REYKJAVIK. THE US NEGOTIATING TEAM IN GENEVA HAVE NOT YET REPORTED FULLY, AND MORE DETAIL MAY EMERGE IN PLENARY SESSIONS IN GENEVA ON 10-12 NOVEMBER. BUT ON THE BASIS OF PRELIMINARY REPORTS FROM GENEVA, ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE FOLLOWING APPEAR TO BE THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS. THEY ARE CLEARLY CLOSELY BASED ON SOVIET REYKJAVIK POSITIONS.

10 YEAR COMMITMENT, TO BE ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES, NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHILE STRICTLY OBSERVING ITS PROVISIONS:

AN AGREEMENT TO BE WORKED OUT ON SDI CONSTRAINTS TO BE OBSERVED DURING THIS 10 YEAR PERIOD. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE:

- A) DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING INSIDE THE LABORATORY WOULD BE PERMITTED;
- B) TESTING OF QUOTE SPACE-BASED ELEMENTS UNQUOTE OF ABM SYSTEMS WOULD BE PROHIBITED,
- C) TESTING OF FIVE LAND-BASED SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS OF ABM

PERMITTED:

B) TESTING OF QUOTE SPACE-BASED ELEMENTS UNQUOTE OF ABM SYSTEMS WOULD BE PROHIBITED,

C) TESTING OF FIXED LAND-BASED SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS OF ABM SYSTEMS WOULD BE PERMITTED, EVEN IF BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES;

D) AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED ON A 3-5 YEAR PERIOD, FOLLOWING THE 10 YEAR PERIOD, DURING WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE HELD ON THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ABM ISSUES ON THE BASIS THAT ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS WOULD BY THEN HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED (SEE BELOW).

6. START

ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO BE ELIMINATED OVER A 10 YEAR PERIOD IN TWO STAGES:

A) THE FIRST STAGE (5 YEARS) TO INVOLVE REDUCTIONS TO 1600 SNDYS AND 6000 WEAPONS ON EACH SIDE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REDUCE THEIR HEAVY MISSILES DURING THIS PERIOD BY 50 PERCENT:
- BOMBER WEAPONS TO BE COUNTED AS IN THE NITZE/AKHROMEYEV FORMULA AGREED IN REYKJAVIK;

- ALL SLCMS WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KMS TO BE LIMITED AT AN AGREED LEVEL AND CONFINED TO TWO TYPES OF SUBMARINE ON EACH SIDE;

- A BAN TO BE AGREED ON CERTAIN KINDS OF MODERNISATION AND NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS;

B) THE SECOND STAGE (FOLLOWING 5 YEARS) TO INVOLVE THE ELIMINATION OF THE REMAINING 50 PERCENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES;

- OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO TO BE LIMITED/ELIMINATED DURING THIS PERIOD;

- APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS TO BE REACHED DURING THIS STAGE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

7. INF

- LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE TO BE REDUCED TO ZERO OVER 5 YEARS;
- MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF LESS THAN 1000 KMS TO BE FROZEN AT EXISTING LEVELS. HOW SUCH SYSTEMS MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY BE DEALT WITH WOULD BE ADDRESSED IN NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING ON FROM AN LRINF AGREEMENT;

- ASIAN SS20S TO BE REDUCED TO 100 WARHEADS AND DEPLOYED OUTSIDE STRIKING RANGE OF US TERRITORY, INCLUDING ALASKA. US LRINF WARHEADS TO BE LIMITED TO 100 AND DEPLOYED IN THE CONTINENTAL US OUTSIDE STRIKING RANGE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

8. NUCLEAR TESTING.

- BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TO BE OPENED IMMEDIATELY;

- THE UK TO BE INVITED TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS QUOTE AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE UNQUOTE;

- THE OPENING OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS A QUOTE PRE-REQUISITE UNQUOTE FOR STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS;

- NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIA TO BE CONSIDERED BY BOTH SIDES WHILE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED;

- LOWER THRESHOLDS AND QUOTAS TO BE CONSIDERED, ALONG WITH APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION MEASURES, IN THE INTERIM;

- THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER WITH RESULTS FROM THE NST NEGOTIATIONS.

COMMENT.

9. FURTHER PRECISION WILL NO DOUBT EMERGE IN THE COURSE OF START, DEFENCE/SPACE AND INF PLENARY SESSIONS IN GENEVA ON 10-12 NOVEMBER, AND THEN IN FULL REPORTS FROM THE US GENEVA DELEGATION.

BUT THE INITIAL PRIVATE REACTIONS OF MANY OF OUR ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS - INCLUDING PERLE (OSD) AND HAWES (STATE) - ARE THAT THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE DISAPPOINTING: NITZE VIEWS THEM AS A STEP BACK FROM REYKJAVIK, AND LARGELY PROPAGANDA-DRIVEN. OUR OWN VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIANS APPEAR TO HAVE (BELATEDLY) DONE PRECISELY WHAT THE US DID LAST MONTH, IE SPELL OUT FORMALLY IN GENEVA THEIR FINAL POSITIONS.

OWN VIEW IS THAT THE RUSSIANS APPEAR TO HAVE (BELATEDLY) DONE PRECISELY WHAT THE US DID LAST MONTH, IE SPELL OUT FORMALLY IN GENEVA THEIR FINAL POSITIONS LEFT ON THE TABLE IN REYKJAVIK AS THE SUMMIT BROKE UP.

10. THE ONLY POSITIVE ASPECTS IMMEDIATELY APPARENT ARE THE SOVIET CONFIRMATION THAT THEY ARE READY TO ACCEPT 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS (PARA 6 (A) ABOVE), AND TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON RESIDUAL ASIAN SS20S (PARA 7 ABOVE). AMONG THE NEGATIVE FEATURES ARE THE VERY TIGHT LINKAGE BETWEEN ALL THE GENEVA BASKETS, AS WELL AS WITH THE NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUE; THE VERY RESTRICTIVE CONSTRAINTS ON SDI RESEARCH PROPOSED FOR THE 10 YEAR PERIOD OF COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY; THE FURTHER 3-5 YEAR PERIOD IN WHICH SDI DEPLOYMENT WOULD PRESUMABLY BE BANNED; THE CONTINUING SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THE ABOLITION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS (OR PERHAPS ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS - SEE PARA 6 (B) ABOVE - DURING THE 10 YEAR PERIOD; AND THE CONTINUING EMPHASIS ON A CTB AND NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIA, RATHER THAN NUCLEAR TESTING THRESHOLD VERIFICATION. BUT ALL THESE FEATURES WERE VISIBLE AT REYKJAVIK.

11. THE ASSUMPTION HERE NOW IS THAT THE PRESENT ROUND IN GENEVA WILL END ON 12 NOVEMBER. THE NEXT ROUND IS NOT DUE UNTIL JANUARY. HOWEVER, KAMPELMAN HAS BEEN GIVEN AUTHORITY TO SUGGEST INTER-SESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS IN DECEMBER AT HEADS OF DELEGATION LEVEL, OR THE RECONVENING THEN OF THE NITZE/KARPOV REYKJAVIK WORKING GROUP, OR A SHORT DECEMBER SESSION OF THE FULL WST TEAMS. BUT US OFFICIALS DOUBT WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WILL AGREE TO ANY OF THESE IDEAS; SHEVARDNAZDE TURNED DOWN IN VIENNA A PROPOSAL FROM SHULTZ THAT THERE SHOULD NOW BE A THIRD NITZE/KARPOV ROUND. (SHULTZ SIMILARLY REJECTED SHEVARDNAZDE'S PROPOSAL FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF ABMT EXPERTS TO AGREE, WITHIN 30 DAYS, ON PRECISE NEW LANGUAGE ON DEFINITIONS RELEVANT TO THE ABMT.)

12. THOUGH THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL AT THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNAZDE (5-6 NOVEMBER) MEETINGS IN VIENNA IS OF COURSE PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NOT AS YET GIVEN THE PRESS ANY ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS TABLED IN GENEVA ON 7 NOVEMBER. THE CONTENTS OF THIS TELEGRAM THEREFORE NEED CAREFUL HANDLING.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 7703

NNNN