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MY TELNO 3015 AND YOUR TELSNO 2082 AND 2088: SALT LIMITS

1. HAWES (POL-MIL/STATE) BRIEFED NATO EMBASSIES ON 28 NOVEMBER ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT (TEXT UN MIFT) MADE BY THE PENTAGON, LATER ON 28 NOVEMBER, THAT THE 131ST ALCM-CARRYING BOMBER IS BEING DEPLOYED TO ITS OPERATIONAL BASE, ALSO ON 28 NOVEMBER.
2. HAWES SAID THAT THE PENTAGON ANNOUNCEMENT AMOUNTED TO CONFIRMATION OF THE POLICY SET OUT BY THE PRESIDENT ON 27 MAY. THAT POLICY HAD NOW BEEN REVIEWED AND CONFIRMED BY THE NSPG. FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF ALCM-CARRYING BOMBERS (WHICH WOULD PROCEED AT THE RATE OF APPROXIMATELY 2 PER MONTH), AND FUTURE OVERHAULS OF POSEIDON SUBMARINES, WOULD BE GUIDED STRICTLY BY STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CRITERIA, AS DECIDED IN MAY. THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRESENT INTENTION WAS THAT ALL POSEIDON SUBMARINES DUE FOR OVERHAUL IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS (8 IN ALL) WOULD BE OVERHAULED AND NOT DISMANTLED. BUT THERE WAS NO US INTENTION RAPIDLY TO BUILD UP US STRATEGIC FORCES: AS ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT ON 27 MAY, IT WAS ADMINISTRATION POLICY NOT TO DEPLOY MORE SNDVS OR BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS THAN DID THE RUSSIANS. NO PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE SELECTION OF 28 NOVEMBER AS THE DATE ON WHICH THE 131ST ALCM-CARRYING BOMBER WOULD BECOME OPERATIONAL: THIS WAS SIMPLY A CONVENIENT DATE FROM A TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL POINT OF VIEW.
3. ASKED WHETHER CONSIDERATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO USING ANY OF THE 3 ESCAPE-CLAUSES REFERRED TO BY THE PRESIDENT ON 27 MAY (SLOW-DOWN IN THE SOVIET STRATEGIC BUILD-UP, CORRECTIVE SOVIET ACTION ON NON-COMPLIANCE, AND SOVIET BEHAVIOUR AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEVA). HAWES SAID THAT THERE HAD CLEARLY BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE FIRST TWO AREAS. INDEED, THE SITUATION MIGHT HAVE WORSENED: IT APPEARED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD IN RECENT WEEKS CEASED TO DISMANTLE SS11S AS SS25S WERE DEPLOYED. HAWES SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS HAD ACCEPTED IN MAY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS WOULD NOT BE REVERSED. AT SUBSEQUENT SCC MEETINGS THE RUSSIANS HAD FAILED TO RAISE SALT ISSUES, OR TO MAKE ANY NOTIFICATIONS UNDER SALT

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